Book Review: Life in the Balance: Exploring the Abortion Controversy. by Robert N. Wennberg. by Levin, Michael




Book Review: Life in the Balance: Exploring the
Abortion Controversy. by Robert N. Wennberg.
Michael Levin
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Levin, Michael, "Book Review: Life in the Balance: Exploring the Abortion Controversy. by Robert N. Wennberg." (1986).
Constitutional Commentary. 717.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/717
500 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 3:495 
rights of property. It would not be surprising to anyone, I trust, if 
the goal of America were found to be the promotion of commerce 
through the protection of property. Of course, Madison's claim is 
not sufficient to make it so. We would wish to consider the history 
of distributive justice in America. Having done that, however, I 
suppose we would find that the Madisonian formula would fare 
very well indeed. 
LIFE IN THE BALANCE: EXPLORING THE ABOR-
TION CONTROVERSY. By Robert N. Wennberg.1 Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 1985. 
Pp. xi, 184. Paper $7.95. 
Michael Levin 2 
It may sound odd to say this about a discussion of a topic as 
grim and contentious as abortion, but Robert Wennberg has written 
an extremely agreeable book, a model of philosophical method. 
Professor Wennberg is an accomplished enough philosopher to be 
unafraid of writing clearly, and of admitting that every position on 
abortion, including his own, will be unsatisfying in some way. Sim-
ply as exposition and a display of intellectual flexibility, Life in the 
Balance is quite superior to Michael Tooley's 1984 book, Abortion 
and Infanticide, the only comparable survey of the abortion issue by 
a philosopher working in the analytic tradition. 
Wennberg devotes most of this book to arguing that the devel-
oping fetus has a right to life. Crucial to the articulation of his case 
is Wennberg's well-taken insistence that the question "Does the fe-
tus have a right to life?" be distinguished from the question "Is the 
fetus a person?," where a person is "a being who possesses the devel-
oped capacity to engage in acts of intellect (to think, to use lan-
guage, etc.), acts of emotion (to love, to hate, etc.), and acts of will 
(to make moral choices, to affirm spiritual ideals, etc.)." What 
Wennberg dubs the "actuality thesis," that only beings that are ac-
tually persons have a right to life, is a substantive moral thesis in no 
way implicit in the concept of a right to life. Actualism, construed 
as a substantive moral thesis, does have the advantage of resolving 
the abortion issue very cleanly: since the cerebral functioning of 
even a very late term fetus is insufficiently integrated to create per-
!. Professor of Philosophy, Westmont College, Santa Barbara. 
2. Professor of Philosophy, City College of New York and the Graduate Center, 
CUNY. 
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sonhood, it is all right to kill them. Wennberg rejects the actuality 
principle and its quick solution to the abortion problem because ac-
tualism also sanctions infanticide, the ten-minute-old neonate being 
no more a "person" in the strict sense than he was eleven minutes 
earlier. 
Wennberg opts instead for the "potentiality principle," accord-
ing to which a being has a right to life if it "will naturally and in due 
course develop into a person."3 The potentiality principle gives the 
intuitively correct answers about neonates, infants, children, the re-
versibly comatose and normal adult humans in dreamless sleep 
(they all have a right to life), and it implies that a fetus, also a po-
tential person, has a right to life. However, the potentiality princi-
ple is itself dogged by counterintuitive consequences, although none 
so serious as infanticide. The congenitally severely retarded and the 
irreversibly comatose are not potential persons, yet they too are or-
dinarily regarded as possessing a right to life. Wennberg meets 
these puzzle cases by making potentiality work in tandem with the 
"overflow principle," according to which the right to life is pos-
sessed by anything that is very much like actual or potential per-
sons, a condition met by the severely retarded and irreversibly 
comatose. Wennberg finds this principle at work in the respect nor-
mally shown to corpses, as it may also be in the ordinary person's 
great unwillingness to dismember dolls or stick a pin in the eyes of a 
photograph of his children. But if potentiality is too narrow in one 
direction, it seems too wide in another, conferring on newly created 
zygotes the same right to life as that possessed by human adults. 
3. Wennberg explains "a human organism has a 'natural' potential for personhood" as 
"it is possible for it to develop into a person without the necessity of outside intervention to 
invest it with new latent properties." This definition is unsatisfactory. Once the male has 
ejaculated into the female, no further intervention is required for a fertilized ovum to come 
into existence if conditions within the vagina suffice for one of the sperm in the ejaculant to 
reach the unfertilized ovum. Does this make the spatially discontinuous object consisting of 
the unfertilized ovum and the sperm vectoring toward it (the kind of thing philosophers call a 
"Goodman object") a potential person? Obviously, too, the fertilized ovum will not develop 
into a person without nurturance, but, says Wennberg, "this is required to sustain the organ· 
ism in its growth rather than to invest it with a growth principle it does not already possess." 
I do not find this distinction intelligible. An organism will develop in some environments and 
fail to develope in others; talk further of potentialities is otiose. I suspect that, like many 
people, Wennberg imagines the "natural" development of an organism as a sort of inertial 
path the organism would take if left to itself, free of environmental constraints-much as the 
inertial path of a physical object is the path it would take if uninfluenced by external forces. 
But the analogy is misconceived: while a physical object can in principle be unaffected by 
external forces, an organism cannot even in principle develop in no environment at all. The 
empirical core of the concept of "naturalness" is the course of an organism's development in 
a certain distinguished environment, namely the environment within which the organism's 
genetic cohort evolved; see Levin, FEMINISM AND FREEDOM (1986); On the Ascription of 
Functions to Objects, 6 PHIL. Soc. Sci. 227-34 (1976); Why Homosexuality is Abnormal, 67 
MONIST 251-83 (1984). 
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Now, as Wennberg recognizes, some people will take this conse-
quence as precisely the right account of zygotic entitlement, there-
fore supporting rather than disconfirming the potentiality principle. 
Wennberg finds the consequence implausible, as will many readers, 
and to block it he deploys the "gradualist theory": the right to life 
comes in degrees, increasing as the potentiality for personhood ap-
proaches personhood itself. Zygotes enjoy a weak right to life, 
human adults the strongest possible right to life, and fetuses a 
strong but not maximal right to life. Wennberg realizes that the 
resulting structure-gradualistic potentialism plus overflow-is ad 
hoc to the point of being ramshackle, but he contends with consid-
erable justice that it accommodates more of our ordinary intuitions 
than any competing structure. 
I 
This repeated appeal to ordinary moral intuition brings us to 
the question of Wennberg's criteria for assessing moral principles. 
He is greatly concerned that his conclusions be at least consistent 
with scripture-a concern not shared by this reviewer-but his ulti-
mate test is coherence with ordinary moral judgments. Thus, while 
it is easy to rout defenders of abortion who inconsistently abhor 
infanticide, Wennberg recognizes that philosophers like Tooley and 
Peter Singer, who rigorously accept both abortion and infanticide, 
are more difficult opponents. In the end, Wennberg rests his rejec-
tion of infanticide, and with it actualism, on "the deeply held moral 
convictions of most people." 
Stated thus nakedly, Wennberg's test is apt to seem arbitrary 
and biased toward moral conservatism. It isn't-but before saying 
a word in its behalf, let me mention one distortion to which it is 
liable, and against which Wennberg may not take sufficient care. 
Ordinary, unphilosophical evaluations must be distinguished from 
ordinary, unphilosophical reactions; moral theories seeking to cap-
ture the principles implicit in everyday moral reasoning must ac-
commodate the former, but need not accommodate untutored and 
probably partially instinctive attractions and aversions. In particu-
lar, Wennberg's defense of the overflow principle seems to slur this 
point. No doubt we all do feel a measure of respect for human re-
mains-the country would have been appalled had NASA treated 
the remains of the Challenger astronauts as so much more debris-
but do we really think that corpses have a right to respect? Pictures 
of people are also "closely associated with persons,"4 and this asso-
4. Wennberg's formulation of the overflow principle. 
1986] BOOK REVIEW 503 
ciation no doubt explains your reluctance to gouge the eyes of pic-
tures of your children, but is this because we think a photograph 
has a right to remain unmutilated? Do dolls have a right not to be 
dismembered? It seems more likely that the resemblance between 
people and their portraits makes it psychologically difficult to muti-
late portraits and no more. If so, the overflow principle is not a 
report of our considered moral judgments, and cannot be used to 
supplement the potentiality principle to help it over countercases. 
To be sure, besides eliciting repugnance, killing the congenitally se-
verely retarded would be judged to be wrong, but the overflow prin-
ciple must be refined considerably before it captures this judgment. 
On how general moral theories are to be assessed, it has been 
clear since Hume's Treatise and Kant's Grundlagen that values do 
not inhere in things themselves in the way that traces of minerals 
do. And not only are moral principles unproveable in the way sci-
entific or mathematical principles are proven, it is not even clear 
just what it is that moral judgments lack insofar as they may be said 
to lack objectivity or truth.s Your only leverage when trying to 
turn someone to your way of thinking on a practical matter is to 
convince him that your way of thinking is implicit in other commit-
ments he himself already feels he must make. The same is true mu-
tandis when your audience is some indefinite group or society in 
general. 
Ad hominem moral reasoning as it is ordinarily practiced may 
seem to leave morality suspended in thin air, but the alternatives 
amount to moralizing in a vacuum. Ethical revisionists defending 
infanticide, animal rights, obligations to deny oneself for the sake of 
the starving in far-away lands, among other positions at odds with 
the settled opinions of their culture,6 frequently complain that the 
ad hominem method stacks the deck against them, since of course 
conventional, hidebound morality will reject their transvaluations 
out of hand. Revisionists suggest that what they are arguing for 
are, precisely, new principles-which is all very well, until someone 
5. Moral principles are imperatives and no adequate account exists of what a veridical 
imperative-or, therefore, a falsidical imperative-might be. The whole problem of moral 
objectivity is one of the most bewildering in philosophy. The present reviewer is persuaded 
that the only hope for reconciling the logical facts with objectivistic intuitions lies with 
Kant's idea that certain commands have "real authority" not because of the intrinsic quality 
of the acts they command, but because a rational will which defied these commands would 
fall into conflict with itself. However, absent a workable version of the Kantian idea, and 
given the inappropriateness of the scientific method in ethics, all moral argument must be, in 
practice, ad hominem. 
6. Curiously, it is often the very same philosophers who urge a greatly enhanced hu-
maneness toward animals and an unlimited right to abort fetuses. One such philosopher 
urges the replacement of animals in medical research by aborted fetuses, on the grounds that 
simply discarding fetal remains is a waste of good tissue. 
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asks how these new principles are themselves to be justified. Not by 
their consistency with heterodox decisions about particular cases, 
surely: that was the very question-begging procedure from which 
the revisionist demanded liberation. By their sheer logical consis-
tency? But if all it takes to justify a moral position is entailment by 
some consistent general principle, all moral positions, including 
those the revisionist would find hideous or ludicrous, are justified. 
One can argue that dusting furniture is immoral in virtue of the 
general right of dust-motes to remain where air currents deposit 
them. Should one point to the conflict between equity for dust-
motes and common sense, the revisionist cannot consistently join 
the attack. In practice, indeed, revisionists reason like everyone 
else-they try to show that infanticide, animal rights or extraordi-
nary efforts to help the starving are commanded by principles al-
ready implicit in convictions presumed to be shared with their 
audience. 
It is critical to Wennberg's argument that infanticide is wrong, 
and Wennberg attempts to show this by noting that anyone likely to 
join the contemporary conversation about abortion thinks infanti-
cide is wrong. Granted, this does not prove that infanticide is 
wrong, and one may worry that from a purely theoretical point of 
view Wennberg has really proven nothing. This is obviously so in 
the sense in which all appeals ad hominem are ill-taken, but in an-
other sense it does not matter. The reader who disapproves of in-
fanticide, and cannot think of a difference he considers significant 
between late-term fetuses and neonates, will find himself unable to 
approve of abortion. From his point of view, Wennberg's argument 
is as good as apodictic. 
Being the only method of moral reasoning whatever, ad 
hominem appeal to prior commitments is a fortiori the only method 
for dealing with abortion. Yet, it should be noted, reproduction is 
so different from other factors that have shaped human morality as 
perhaps to be in some measure beyond even this final court of ap-
peal. For where do moral commitments come from? To sharpen 
the question by understanding moral approval to be an uncondi-
tional readiness to reinforce, 7 why do societies reinforce the types of 
7. It is often pointed out, in objection to analyses of moral discourse which emphasize 
its directive character, that people commonly pass moral judgments on historical events be-
yond their powers to affect. Why does anyone feel critical of the Katyn massacre if it is no 
longer possible to encourage Stalin not to commit it? There is no anomaly in historical judg-
ment if moral approval is a readiness to reinforce, which may be triggered with greater or 
lesser intensity by different stimuli. Disapproval of the Katyn massacre is akin to the muscle 
contractions experienced by a passenger in an automobile who sees an obstacle in the road 
and "steps on the brake." 
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behavior they do? Clearly, a group must reinforce-and encourage 
each of its members to reinforce-those behaviors which enhance 
the likelihood of the group's surviving and transmitting its values to 
the next generation. A society whose moral code does not reinforce 
behavior that enhances group fitness will be at a disadvantage when 
competing with a group whose code does, and will normally disap-
pear. A society's members may individually obey its code because 
they believe it to be of divine origin, or self-evidently correct. The 
code itself may reflect the contributions of local revisionists. But a 
code will become entrenched only if it enhances group solidarity.s 
Not all preconditions for social existence are the concern of 
morality, however. There have to be people if there are to be socie-
ties, but for the most part societies rely on biological impulses for 
new members. People do not need encouragement to copulate. Un-
til very recently, it would have been inefficient and redundant for 
society to encourage mothers to nurture their children. That part of 
morality which does concern reproduction serves primarily to curb 
the male's anarchic desire to copulate with as many females as pos-
sible. Morality is a technique for averting and resolving strains lia-
ble to disrupt ongoing groups and has relatively little to do with the 
biological basis of human existence; it evolved to deal with what 
goes on between adult human beings, not with biological ultimates. 
In particular, the processes of fetal development and birth are quite 
remote from the universe of morality, and it is not clear how the 
rules of the moral universe can be extrapolated to them. Try to 
extrapolate we must, since it is the only game in town, but it is to be 
anticipated that any moral analogy between abortion and anything 
else will be forced and artificial, and unhelpful at critical junctures. 
This expectation is borne out by the final twenty-five pages of Life 
in the Balance. 
II 
The reader of this review has probably assumed by now, as did 
its author up to page 150 of Life in the Balance, that Wennberg is 
carefully and honestly presenting a not unfamiliar case against le-
galized abortion. In fact, the penultimate chapter of Life in the Bal-
ance defends legalized abortion in terms so sweeping as to lead the 
8. Some values, like warlikeness, confer group fitness in some environments only, 
while others, like honesty, confer group fitness in virtually all environments. Also, readiness 
to reinforce some group-fitness-enhancing behaviors, especially those adaptive in all environ-
ments, are by now probably part of the human genetic program. The offspring of individuals 
endowed with such a readiness, being more likely than the offspring of individuals Jacking 
such a readiness to be reared in a stable society, are more likely to reach sexual maturity. 
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reader to forget that Wennberg thinks there is something wrong 
with abortion. 
The heart of Wennberg's defense is the individual's sovereignty 
over his own body. No one has a right to make one person put his 
body at the disposal of another, so in particular the other members 
of society have no right to use the law to make a pregnant woman 
let her fetus use her body. If I understand Wennberg correctly, he 
does believe a pregnant woman should indeed help her fetus to 
term, especially if her pregnancy is a result of intercourse volun-
tarily undertaken, but such generosity cannot be forced from her. 
Wennberg recognizes that her right to deny the use of her body to 
her fetus entitles her only to evict her fetus, not to kill it-it is one 
thing to oust an unwanted houseguest by forcing him to leave, 
knowing he will die in the storm ranging outside, quite another to 
oust him by shooting him and dumping his body. Abortion proce-
dures in which the abortionist induces labor by first killing the fetus 
are therefore impermissible, and Wennberg apparently believes that 
such procedures should be illegal.9 Wennberg also recognizes that a 
pregnant woman will retain a right only to transfer her fetus to an 
artificial womb if and when such devices become available, and not 
to leave her fetus in environments in which it is more vulnerable-
just as a man who can conveniently show an unwanted guest to the 
door may not defenestrate him. These admittedly important cave-
ats aside, Wennberg's position is the one encapsulated by the 
bumper-sticker appeal to "a woman's right to her own body." 
What is most curious about this position, in view of 
Wennberg's route to it, is that the right to life of the fetus has be-
come irrelevant to both the legality and the moral propriety of abor-
tion. For if abortion is only the refusal of the pregnant woman to 
help her fetus stay alive, the woman (or her medical surrogate) who 
aborts her fetus in no way transgresses the fetus's right to life. Why 
Wennberg has taken such pains to establish a fetal right not to be 
killed when he will defend the legalization of abortion on the 
grounds that abortion is not killing, is something of a mystery.Io 
9. "What follows is not that the mother can't disconnect herself from the son but that 
a procedure for disconnection that does not involve killing him first must be followed. The 
implication for abortion would be that procedures that also share this restriction must be 
used." Unfortunately, Wennberg does not say whether he intends the "must" here to mean 
"must morally" or "must legally." One might wonder if any abortion procedure really 
avoids aggressing against the fetus. Wennberg mentions hysterectomy, the induction oflabor 
by exogenous prostaglandin, and the induction of labor by severing the umbilical cord. Do I 
avoid aggressing against you if I cut off all the air to a room you are trapped in? 
10. After rereading the relevant sections of Life in the Balance, I am confident that 
Wennberg quite sensibly uses "A has a right to life" to mean "It is wrong to kill A"; see 
especially pages 100-101, 166-67 n.l3. He observes elsewhere that the right to abortion does 
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Wennberg reaches his conclusion via a revised edition of Judith 
Jarvis Thomson's familiar argument about the woman and the vio-
linist.'' Professor Thomson asks the reader to imagine a woman 
waking up one morning to find that the "Society of Music Lovers" 
has attached her to a famous violinist suffering from a kidney ail-
ment. If the woman lets him remain attached to her for nine 
months he will live; if she unhooks him he will die. Most people 
will agree that the woman ought to be legally free to unhook herself. 
Whether to donate the use of her kidneys to the violinist is nobody's 
business but hers. But, the argument continues, the fetus is to its 
host just as the violinist is to the woman kidnapped by the music 
society. Therefore, anyone recognizing the woman's right to un-
hook the violinist must also recognize the pregnant woman's right 
to unhook the fetus. 
Wennberg is aware that the two cases as presented are wildly 
divergent, but before turning to his attempts to align them, two 
comments need to be made about Professor Thomson's argument in 
its original form. First, it is a revealing unconscious expression of 
the feminist attitude toward reproduction: bringing a fetus to term 
is a Kafkaesque nightmare imposed on a woman by strangers en-
tirely indifferent to her own desires. The point of keeping the wo-
man forcibly attached to a famous violinist is, presumably, that she 
is being forced to support someone important to other people but 
whose existence may be meaningless to her-the victiminized wo-
man may, as the reader semi-consciously registers, be completely 
indifferent to classical music. Feminists have lately taken to pro-
testing that the man-hating and child-hating of which they were ac-
cused in the early years of their movement was all a 
misunderstanding; anyone who rereads Thomson's original article 
will see just how accurate that first impression was. Second, while 
appeal to an absolute right to the disposition of one's body coheres 
well with other strongly libertarian positions (laissez faire in the 
marketplace, parental autonomy in the education of their children, 
freedom of private association), this appeal is most commonly made 
by feminists who are antilibertarian on just about every other issue. 
Feminists who advocate state-mandated quotas, state-mandated 
not include a right to the use of public funds to purchase an abortion, since the right to 
abortion is the right not to be interfered with in having an abortion, while the right to public 
funding is a right to be helped to have an abortion. By parity of reasoning the right not to be 
killed does not include a right to be helped to stay alive, and it must be assumed that 
Wennberg recognizes this. If I have somehow misread Wennberg and he does believe a right 
to life entails a right to be helped to stay alive, abortion so patently invades this more inclu-
sive "right to life" that all of Wennberg's arguments for legalizing abortion immediately 
break down. 
II. See Thomson, A Defense of Abonion, I PHIL & PUB. AFF. 47-66 (1971). 
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comparable worth pay scales, the censorship of "sexist" textbooks 
in the public schools, laws against "sexually harassing speech" and 
legal limitations on private association excluding homosexuals, will 
go on to advocate abortion on the basis of an absolutist libertarian-
ism at odds with every one of those policies. It is remarkable that 
this inconsistency has not been more widely noted.Iz 
Considered in itself, the plight of Thomson's exploited woman 
differs from that of the unraped expectant woman insofar as the 
violinist is a stranger, whom the woman has not volunteered to help 
and whose dependency on her is not her doing. Wennberg's effort 
to strengthen the analogy is easily the most and interesting impor-
tant section of his book. Wennberg has no trouble repairing the 
first two defects: he stipulates that the violinist is the woman's son, 
and that she has volunteered for the hookup. Wennberg also wisely 
stipulates that the hookup is much less onerous than the one Thom-
son describes, but he inexplicably retains the proviso that the para-
site is a violinist. As noted, this proviso serves only to carry along 
the feminist assumption that women have no special feelings toward 
their babies, and its equation of a fetus with a dependent adult (for 
the typical famous violinist is an adult) muddles Wennberg's argu-
ment at its most delicate point. 
This point is reached when Wennberg attempts to inject the 
mother's responsibility for the dependency of her son: 
Let us suppose that a violinist is unconscious and dying, with only a few hours 
to live, and that the only thing that can save him is a serum made by fluids pro-
duced by his mother's body. Let us suppose that his mother takes the initiative, 
produces the serum, and has it applied to the violinist, with the result that he is 
cured of the disease that otherwise would have killed him. Let us now suppose, 
however, that this serum is a mixed blessing, that although it saves the violinist 
from dying of the disease he had contracted, it also produces a dependency upon the 
use of the woman's body such that if her body is not periodically available to him 
for nine months he will die. 
In saving her son from certain death by a deadly disease, the woman does 
much the same thing for him that she had done in conceiving him in the first place. 
In both cases had she not acted ... her son would not now exist. And in both cases, 
because she does act, her son receives biological life and becomes dependent upon 
her body for a period of time . . . . [I]n the one instance the woman brings into 
existence a person that did not previously exist, whereas in the other instance she 
grants an already existing but moribund person a second lease on life, but this does 
not appear to constitute a significant moral difference .... 
I also think that most people would agree that it would be wrong to force her 
to remain connected if she wished it otherwise . . .. 
The imperfections in Wennberg's analogy remind the reader, 
12. For a fuller discussion of why feminism wars with personal liberty, seeM. LEVIN, 
FEMINISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 3. 
1986] BOOK REVIEW 509 
once again, that the only state remotely like pregnancy is preg-
nancy. Wennberg must assume, to preserve the analogy, that the 
other was fully aware before agreeing to donate the serum that her 
son might become addicted to it if it saved him, just as a woman is 
fully aware when consenting to intercourse that any fetus that may 
result will be dependent on her. Wennberg should also say that 
such occurrences as he describes are commonplace, and that most 
women in the course of their lives routinely act so as to make inti-
mates dependent on sera from their bodies. I suspect that 
Wennberg would squirm a bit at having to say that the violinist's 
mother should still be free to withhold the serum, but he probably 
would stand his ground. 
But even extended in this way, Wennberg's argument seriously 
misrepresents the responsibility of the pregnant woman for her fe-
tus's dependency on her. Creation makes more difference than 
Wennberg supposes; in initially saving her son, the violinist's 
mother does something quite different than she did in conceiving 
him. For although the violinist's mother creates a dependency by 
giving her son the serum, her son's original kidney problem was 
presumably not her fault. Independently of her, her son was on a 
trajectory toward death when she first intervened. If she reneges on 
her agreement about the serum, her son will be no worse off than he 
would have been, had his mother never offered to help him in the 
first place. That is why his mother's subsequent withdrawal of the 
use of her body can plausibly be construed as a failure to save, 
rather than killing. If you catch a vase that has fallen from a win-
dow, hold it for a second, and then drop it, you are arguably not 
liable for damages, because the vase owner's property ends up in no 
worse shape than it would have been had you never interceded. 
However, if the vase was on its original trajectory to destruction 
because of you, you are properly liable. Releasing the vase is not a 
mere failure to save it, if you were the one who threw it out the 
window. In general, the agent who initiates a causal chain may be 
obligated to intercede. By the same principle, the agent can be 
legitimately forced to make whole any damage he causes in the 
course of interceding. Frisbees are unique among missiles in that 
they can be outrun by their throwers. Suppose I launch an explo-
sive frisbee at your head. Clearly, I can beforced to intercept it-1 
will face much stiffer charges if I don't catch it than if I do, and I 
won't be able to plead that I merely failed to save you. Suppose too 
that the only path I can take to intercept the frisbee carries me over 
your foot, and my stepping on your foot somehow makes you de-
pendent on my body for nine months. I should most certainly not 
be free to deny you the use of my body, for without it you will be 
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much worse off than you would have been had I never intervened in 
your life.I3 We might say in case like this that I am completely 
responsible for your dependency. 
So there is an important difference between the relation of a 
pregnant woman to her fetus and the relation of the' violinist's 
mother to her addicted son: the fetus, which did not exist before 
becoming dependent on its mother, was not already on a trajectory 
toward death when his mother first intervened. However, the rela-
tion of the pregnant woman to her fetus is also unlike that of the 
frisbee thrower to his target. The fetus, which did not exist before 
becoming dependent on his mother, was also not on a trajectory 
toward a state preferable to death when his mother first intervened. 
Since nothing can be done to what does not exist, the conceiving 
woman does not make her fetus dependent on her, hence she is not 
responsible for her fetus's dependency in the way the violinist's 
mother is, nor is she completely responsible for her fetus's depen-
dence. All that can be said is that the mother is responsible for 
there being something dependent on her. 
Only by examining other test cases involving creation is it pos-
sible to decide whether this sort of responsibility for dependence 
justifies enforcement of assistance. Here are three cases which sug-
gest that the mother's failure to sustain her fetus is killing and hence 
legitimately preventable. The remoteness from reality of the first 
two is perhaps another reminder that the only thing remotely like 
pregnancy is pregnancy itself. 
1) You can will vases into existence, but only in mid-air. Af-
ter you will a vase into existence it obeys natural laws, so its contin-
ued existence depends on your catching it. Since the vases you 
create would not have existed at all but for your intervention, it 
makes no sense to say that they would have been tougher had you 
never intervened; therefore, you do not make the vases you create 
fragile. You are, however, completely responsible for there being a 
fragile vase when you create one, and even though it makes no sense 
to ask what fate would have awaited one of your vases had you 
never created it, it does seem that the shards on the floor are your 
doing if you fail to catch a vase you create. Are you a vase-breaker? 
Well, suppose someone has agreed to buy one of your vases for 
$5,000, with the understanding that he has to pay if something hap-
pens to the vase after you create it, so long as you are not the one 
13. As this example shows, the killing!letting die distinction is logically posterior to, 
and cannot be used to decide, what actions can and cannot be prevented by force. I kill you 
by failing to catch the frisbee because I am obligated it catch it; it would be a confusion to say 
that I am obligated to catch it because failure to do so would be killing rather than letting die. 
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who destroys it. You will a vase into existence with your hands at 
your sides, watch it smash, and demand payment from your patron. 
Surely no court would require that he pay up-which means that, 
in the eyes of the law, you smashed the vase. Similarly, you would 
have killed any living thing you created high in the air and failed to 
catch. Were you able to create a potential person in mid-air at will, 
you would violate its right to life if you let it fall. Such are the 
consequences of complete responsibility for the existence of a de-
pendent thing. 
2) Many theists wish to excuse God for man's sinful ways by 
pointing out that free beings are necessarily prone to sin. God does 
not make his creatures sinful; that's the way they have to be if they 
are to have free will. Skeptics unwilling to exempt God reply that it 
was still up to God whether to create creatures with free will; since 
he could have refrained from making man altogether, he is com-
pletely responsible for the sinfulness of his creatures, even if he did 
not make his creatures sinful. Therefore, it has been traditionally 
argued, God has caused suffering, and not merely refrained from 
preventing suffering, by not curbing the sinfulness of his creatures. 
The sceptic surely has a strong case. 
3) Wennberg, it will be recalled, rightly holds that we should 
be free to do to newborns what we should be free to do to fetuses. 
Now, while newborns do not depend on the bodies of their parents 
in the way fetuses do, they do depend on the bodies of their parents 
in less direct ways. (The health of nursing infants does depend di-
rectly on a substance manufactured by the mother's body, and their 
lives depend upon it if formula is unavailable.) Suppose a couple 
put their newborn in a crib, unlock the front door-to allow the 
baby to seek its own food and to allow strangers to feed it-and do 
not move from their easy chairs until the baby starves. This would 
normally be considered murder-but suppose the couple claims 
that they merely failed to help their newborn. What if the couple 
went on the offensive and cited their right to the use of their own 
bodies? How can other people force them to assist their baby? By 
threatening them if they do not at least fetch some formula from the 
refrigerator, other people are making the couple use their muscles 
and metabolize stored carbohydrates just so that someone else may 
live. By what right does the state put their bodies at the service of 
their child? Wennberg, for one, has no answer. 
All child-support laws make the parental body an indirect re-
source for the child. If the father is a construction worker, the state 
will intervene unless some of the calories he expends lifting equip-
ment go to providing food for his children. Philosophers are paid 
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for spinning arguments out of their neocortexes, and are subject to 
state intervention if they do not share their pay with their offspring. 
If I refuse to feed my young children, the state will seize them and 
use other people's tax money, coercively collected, to feed them. To 
be sure, the courts will not force a parent to donate bone marrow to 
his dying child, but such cases involve an unusual dependency upon 
the parent's body, as do the Wennberg-Thomson cases. Our moral 
intuitions respond to their unusualness. Such cases obscure soci-
ety's willingness to back by force the expectation that parents will 
meet their children's ordinary need for food and clothing by the 
ordinary process of metabolizing stored carbohydrates. If serum 
transfers were a standard phase of reproduction, mankind would 
have evolved tolerance for the coercion of serum from parental 
bodies. 
The present reviewer has no quarrel with libertarianism-he 
would like to see it applied to affirmative action, comparable worth, 
civil rights and other items on the feminist agenda-but it must be 
understood somewhat differently for children than it is for adults. 
Children, infants, and fetuses are too dependent on others and too 
little capable of reasoned choice for coercible obligations toward 
them to end at nonaggression. While the ordinary person may not 
have carried his inquiries as far as the metaphysics of creation, he 
intuitively understands that to fail to care for a totally dependent 
being you created is to harm it. 
The impulse to hurt people who neglect their children is an 
essential part of the mores of any society that hopes to survive. It 
may possibly have enhanced inclusive fitness when mankind was 
evolving and gotten itself selected into our genes. Considering how 
deep this impulse runs, it is perhaps surprising that a writer as 
thoughtful as Wennberg should make the legality (and morality) of 
abortion tum on abstruse metaphysical issues about causation. Af-
ter all, in past decades, when the libertarian sentiment was much 
stronger in the United States than it is now and a person's "right to 
his own body" was otherwise axiomatic, abortion was deemed en-
tirely beyond the pale. Wennberg himself seems worried about the 
replacement of this attitude by the current "abortion mentality," 
which sees abortion as a morally neutral convenience to be used by 
a woman whenever she feels like it. The turning point, I suspect, 
was the moment sexual egalitarians became convinced that biology 
was unfair. Egalitarians were scandalized that sexual intercourse 
should be riskier for a woman than for a man, and outraged by the 
assumption (which they regarded as a social artifact) that it would 
be the woman who cared for the infant she bore. Abortion was thus 
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seen by egalitarians not as a hitherto unrecognized affirmation of 
libertarian values, but as a way to "liberate" women from childbirth 
and motherhood. We will have to wait and see whether the conse-
quent devaluation of the unique female biological role has liberated 
women or set them adrift. But in any case that is the way the issue 
of abortion has evolved in the United States during the last third of 
the twentieth century. Feminists and their juristic allies who appeal 
to a woman's right to her own body do not characteristically base 
this appeal on the killing/letting die distinction; they seem willing 
to allow that abortion is killing, but hold that the woman's right to 
her own body justifies it. Admirable as is Wennberg's philosophical 
craftsmanship, and accurate as is his pinpointing of the conceptual 
abortion issue as fetal right to life versus libertarian values, the pith 
of the abortion debate actually raging today is the fetal right to life 
versus certain notions of sexual equality. 
THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DE-
MOCRACY. By John Agresto.1 Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 1984. Pp. 167. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $7.95. 
David E. Engdah/2 
In small compass, this book sets new bearings for exploration 
of the judicial role in a polity at once claiming democratic postu-
lates and constitutional restraints. The author finds defective both 
in theory and in consequence not only the thesis of judicial 
supremacy over constitutional doctrine, but also the counteractive 
thesis that popular opinion or democratic actions should control the 
constitutional opinions of courts. Dr. Agresto endorses judicial in-
dependence-including a vigorous independence in exercising the 
function of judicial review; yet judicial supremacy troubles him as 
much as attempts to restrain the judiciary. 
It seems not quite accurate to call his "a middle path" -even 
though Agresto himself uses that metaphor. That expression con-
notes compromise in quest of repose, accommodating divergent 
views. Rather than repose, Dr. Agresto points a course of continu-
ing, creative conflict. "What is needed," he suggests, 
is a way ... to keep democracy, constitutionalism, and judicial review in a support-
ive and complementary relationship to one another; that is, to keep the tension in 
balance, not to resolve it. ... 
I. Acting Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities. 
2. Professor, University of Puget Sound School of Law. 
